Scientia intuitiva in the Ethics by Primus, Kristin
chapter 8
Scientia Intuitiva in the Ethics
Kristin Primus
I.
What is scientia intuitiva, and how is it diﬀerent from the other kind of
adequate cognition, reason? Some have argued that reason establishes that
something is so, while scientia intuitiva establishes why something is so.1
Others maintain that only scientia intuitiva is cognition of essences.2 I agree
that both kinds of cognition provide distinct causal explanations, and that
scientia intuitiva is cognition of essences. Nevertheless, I want to oﬀer an
alternative interpretation that better explains: (1) the epistemic superiority
of scientia intuitiva, (2) how such cognition can be (and indeed must be)
intuitive, and (3) how the exercise of reading the Ethicsmight itself help us
attain scientia intuitiva.
In the next section, I will argue that reason yields adequate, clear, and
distinct ideas of how things must be if those things are.3What reason does not
yield, however, is the assurance that adequate, clear, and distinct representa-
tions of external things agree with extra-mental, formally real ideata, and so
are true.4 In Section III, I argue that the “formal” in Spinoza’s description of
scientia intuitiva indicates formal reality, and in Section IV, I argue that what
secures the assurance that one’s clear and distinct ideas are true is a correct
conception of God (as the one and only substance) and howGod is related to
things (as an immanent cause of its modes).
So understood, scientia intuitiva looks Cartesian. Even though Spinoza
dispenses with a benevolent, transcendent God, he retains the Cartesian
1 See Carr, “Spinoza’s Distinction”; D. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Theory”; Melamed, “Mapping the
Labyrinth”; and Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics, 180–181.
2 See D. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Theory”; Soyarslan, “The Distinction”; and Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry,
24–25.
3 An adequate idea’s representational content is caused by, and can be fully explained by, other
representational contents within the mind. See E2p11c, E2p29s, and E2p38d. E2p29s suggests that
adequate ideas are clear and distinct.
4 E1a6.
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idea that scientia requires a correct conception of God and God’s role as
a sustaining cause. This suggests that Spinoza also thinks having clear and
distinct ideas is necessary, but not suﬃcient, for certainty. This is surpris-
ing: passages in the Ethics seem to say that adequate ideas need no addi-
tional validation, and so there simply isn’t a gap a skeptic could exploit.
In Section V, I maintain that while reason and scientia intuitiva both confer
certainty, the reason’s certainty has a restricted domain.
If what secures scientia is a correct conception of God, then it may seem
that one can achieve scientia intuitiva simply by following the Ethics’
demonstrations for substance monism. In the last section, I argue that
the way a cognizer arrives at the content substance monism is the correct
metaphysical system must be via intuition.
II.
In E2p40s2, after pointing out that human beings perceive many things and
form universal notions, Spinoza describes cognition ﬁtting this schema.
There is “cognition of the ﬁrst kind”: from fortuitous perceptions, one
forms categorizing universals like dog5 and universals specifying habitual,
associative transitions between ideas.6
Cognition of the second kind, or reason, is next: “we perceive many
things, and form universal notions . . . from the fact that we have
common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things.”
A merchant seeking a missing fourth proportional reasons when he per-
forms the calculation “from the force of the demonstration” of Euclid’s
common property of proportionals; he’s not calculating mechanically,
but is rather seeing that the answer follows with necessity from other
adequate ideas he has.7
But how does the cognizer acquire these common notions and ade-
quate ideas in the ﬁrst place? Although he must start from confused ideas,
since the human mind must initially cognize itself and its body through
confused representations of bodily aﬀections,8 reﬂection on confused
representations of things can deliver adequate representations of features
of things, provided those features are wholly present in each part of each
represented thing.
5 E2p40s1. 6 Cf. E2p18s. 7 See E3p1d.
8 E2p19, E2p23. I will set aside the question of how representations of things distinct from the body
arise from representations of bodily aﬀections. I agree with Della Rocca (Representation, 49–53) that
representation of one’s body and indirect representations of external bodies are not diﬀerent kinds of
representation.
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Take being extended. Any body and every part of any body is extended.
The representational content body is extended can be wholly explained by any
representation of any body, so it is adequate. Furthermore, any representa-
tion of anybody whatsoever, whenever, must be a representation of some-
thing extended. Body is extended is universal and apodictic; even if being
extended isn’t a feature suﬃcient to diﬀerentiate bodies, it is a feature all
bodies must have. It thus counts as a “common notion.”9
Other common notions include axioms concerning bodies (e.g., “all
bodies must be either at motion or at rest” (E2p13PhysDigA1’)) and general
axioms concerning features “equally in the part and whole” of representa-
tions of bodies or ideas (e.g., Part I’s axioms, ex nihilo nihil ﬁt,10 the law of
noncontradiction).
In addition to the general common notions, there are adequate represen-
tations of equally-in-the-whole-and-part features common to human bodies
and external bodies that aﬀect human bodies (E2p39). The representation
of any bodily aﬀection must implicate the nature of the external body
(E1a4, E2p16), so implicated in any representation of a causal aﬀection is
a commonality between the nature of the aﬀecting body and the nature of
the aﬀected body that can, at least in principle, be discerned.11
So, from perception and reﬂection on perception, a cognizer can
acquire adequate representations of necessary features of things, whether
logically necessary (the law of non-contradiction), necessary within an
attribute (“a body must be at motion or at rest”), or necessary according
to some nature (“the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is 180 degrees”).
A cognizer can also acquire adequate representations of necessary relations
between features; such “universals” specify necessary – and not merely
imaginative or associative – transitions between ideas. To return to the
reasoning merchant, in grasping a necessary property of extension, the
common property of all proportional lines, he can form a universal notion,
in this case an idea of a function: given some proportionals, another
proportional necessarily follows. Reason’s universals can be used to infer
adequate ideas of properties from given adequate ideas.
I think it’s misleading to characterize reason as only proceeding from
ideas of causally posterior eﬀects, thus only yielding ideas that something is
so. A cognizer may acquire adequate ideas from (reﬂection on) ideas of
9 E2p37–38. An attribute is what the intellect perceives as the essence of substance, while a common
notion is what the intellect perceives as equally in the part and whole of (representations) of things.
“All bodies are extended” and “all ideas pertain to thought” can be common notions even if the
attributes Extension and Thought are not.
10 Cf. Cartesian “common notions” (AT VIIIA 23–24, 38). 11 See E5p4.
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causally posterior eﬀects, but acquiring ideas is not reasoning – reasoning
requires using the universal notions to infer further adequate ideas. One
could use a universal notion to determine what cause necessarily follows
from a given eﬀect, but one could also use a universal specifying the inverse
function.12 Both are deductive reasoning; it’s just that the deduction in
one case is deduction to some idea about a cause while in the other it’s
a deduction to some idea about an eﬀect.
Even if reason is not limited to one direction of demonstration, it is
nevertheless limited in other ways. First, it does not deliver adequate ideas
of individuating essences. A cognizer with common notions and adequate
ideas of properties grasps how all of extension (or thought), or particular
things in extension (or thought), must be.13 But such ideas are not suﬃ-
cient to individuate one thing from all other things. Reason’s adequate
ideas are based on reﬂection on bodily aﬀections, and a body can only
be aﬀected by another body if the bodies have something in common;
a reasoner cannot identify properties his body does not also have, so while
he can have an adequate idea of a set of properties that some individuals
share, it seems he cannot have adequate ideas of individuating essences.14
Because reason cannot deliver knowledge of individual essences, some
commentators argue that scientia intuitiva is intuitive insight into individ-
uating essences.15 E2p40s2’s gloss of scientia intuitiva does mention
essences, so I can see the initial appeal of this view. But I think this proposal
leaves the question of whether (and how) such intuition is possible for
ﬁnite human minds unanswered; it makes scientia intuitiva into a sort of
deus ex machina cognition that somehow delivers what reason cannot.
Yet there seems to be a second way reason is limited. Reﬂection on
representations of aﬀections of the body yield common notions and ade-
quate ideas of properties, and a reasoning cognizer can represent how things
must be if those things are formally real. But how can he know that his
body, or any impinging bodies, have formal reality?
One might point to E2p11, “The ﬁrst thing which constitutes the actual
being of a human mind is nothing but the idea of a singular thing which
actually exists,” and E2p13, “the object [objectum] of the idea [ideatum]
constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension
which actually exists, and nothing else,” and insist that a human mind
12 Perhaps universal notions are Janus-faced, with each face the inverse function of the other.
13 For reasons that will be clearer later on, I do not think a reasoner thereby grasps necessary and eternal
features of extension as inﬁnite modes of extended substance.
14 See E2p25d. 15 See Soyarslan, “The Distinction.”
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cannot wonder whether or not his body actually exists.16 Or one might
point to E2p34, “every idea which in us is absolute, that is, adequate and
perfect, is true,” and E1a6’s statement that true ideas agree with their
ideata, and insist that a cognizer cannot wonder about the veridicality of
his clear and distinct adequate ideas.
Notice, however, that these propositions presuppose that the mind is 1)
a mode of the one substance considered under the attribute of thought and
2) part of the inﬁnite intellect of God. Until a cognizer is a committed
Spinozist, these propositions will not be evident at all, and it would be
objectionably dogmatic for him to simply assert that his adequate – clear
and distinct – representations are true.
While Spinoza does not deploy the method of doubt, his account of
the genesis of common notions and adequate ideas of properties invites
a question from the ﬁrst-person point of view of the reasoning cognizer:
“How can I be certain that objectively real representations of bodies have
formally real referents?”17
III. Formal Essences
Cognition of the third kind “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition of the [NS:
formal] essence of things” (E2p40s2). On the view I develop in Section IV,
scientia intuitiva assures a cognizer that all of his adequate representations
agree with something formally real. But why think scientia intuitiva con-
cerns formal reality? In this section, I argue that when Spinoza introduces
formal essences in E2p8, he does so to emphasize formal reality.
E2p8 is sometimes interpreted as introducing two kinds of essences,
formal and actual.18 The actual essence of a thing, later identiﬁed as its
conatus (E3p7), is such that when it is given as existing, the thing is posited
as actually existing, while a formal essence of a thing is something such that
16 I read objectum as an idea’s representational content and ideatum as the idea’s referent.
17 A reasoner can represent any representation as an act of thinking, and can form a higher-order
representation of that act of thinking, thus forming a representation with an objectively real
objectum that he can know agrees with a formally real ideatum (that is, the original act of thinking).
Spinoza, like Descartes, can allow for reﬂexive, performative, self-verifying ideas. But it is one thing
to know that a represented idea agrees with an idea, but it is another thing to make the claim that
a represented body agrees with a body, as this requires that one know that thought is related to
extension in a way that licenses such claims. See Section V.
18 See D. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Theory.” Others think formal essences are eternal and actual essences
durational. See Huenemann, “The Necessity of Finite Modes” and Viljanen, “Spinoza’s Essentialist
Model.”
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when it is given as existing, the thing is posited as possible. The example in
E2p8s seems to support this reading: there, Spinoza contrasts actually
drawn lines with all possibly drawn ones.
I do not think Spinoza introduces two sorts of essences here.19 Rather,
his main point is that in God’s inﬁnite intellect, every objectively real
representation of something, even representations of things not existing
in duration, corresponds to something formally real. I think E2p8 can be
read with the following interpolation, which preserves the grammatical
parallelism: “The ideas of singular things . . . that do not exist must be
comprehended in God’s inﬁnite idea in the same way as the formal essences
of the singular things [that do not exist] . . . are contained in God’s
attributes.”
It makes sense for Spinoza to say exactly this at this point. First, he has
already made formal reality salient: the point of E2p5 is that ideas have
formal reality because they are modes of God caused by God (but to
understand this causation, God must be considered under the attribute
of thought). Mutatis mutandis for the formal reality of things that are not
modes of thought (E2p6). Second, it makes sense for Spinoza to highlight
the perfect correspondence of the inﬁnite intellect’s representations and
formally real ideata: both E2p7, “the order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things,” and E2p7c make explicit that
there is something matching each idea in God’s inﬁnite intellect.
E2p8 further clariﬁes what an inﬁnite intellect represents: universal,
pervasive, necessary structural features of formally real extension and
thought. For example, there are representations of the structural features
of extension ensuring that “rectangles formed from the segments of all the
straight lines intersecting it are equal to one another” (E2p8s). And there
are representations of durationally existing singular things caused by other
durationally existing singular things, such as representations of actually
drawn lines and representations of their construction. The scholium’s
example, which mentions ideas of all the lines that are not drawn, suggests
there are also representations of singular things that do not have actual,
durational existence.
Each objectively real representation in the inﬁnite intellect agrees with
something formally real, since all ideas in the inﬁnite intellect are true.
So a representation of an actually drawn line will agree with something
formally real – an actually drawn line. A representation of a never-to-be-
actually-drawn line will also agree with something formally real,
19 See Laerke, “Aspects of Spinoza’s Theory of Essence,” for another argument for this conclusion.
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a potential-but-not-actually-drawn line. If “formal essences” have formal
reality corresponding to objectively real representations,20 then there will
be formal essences of actually-drawn lines and of not-actually-drawn-but-
still-potential lines. Formal and actual essences are not diﬀerent kinds
of essence: an actual essence, which is formally real, is a formal essence.
Formal essences are not exclusively eternal.
I think it’s a mistake to dismiss the talk of formal essences in E2p40s2 as
an erratum or redundancy.21 True, the second “formal” in E2p40s2’s gloss
of scientia intuitiva is found only in the Dutch translation of the Ethics
published just after Spinoza died, so perhaps it was a misguided editor’s
amendment. However, since one or more of Spinoza’s friends likely made
this translation,22 it’s plausible that they knew Spinoza’s work well and
thought that “formal” signals something important: namely, that this
highest sort of cognition involves cognition of the formal reality of God
and of the formal reality of things.23
IV.
Cognition of the third kind “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal
essence of certain attributes of God” (E2p40s2). On my view, it proceeds
from an adequate idea of what God fundamentally is: the one necessarily
formally real substance in which all things inhere as modes and that can be
considered under the attributes of thought and extension.24 I will say more
later, but once a cognizer has this adequate idea, he can see that adequate
ideas of bodily aﬀections – the adequate representations on which all other
adequate ideas of reason are based – agree with formally real extension.
Having seen that all his adequate representations are true and agree with
formal reality, he can use universals of reason to proceed to adequate ideas
of formally real things. The certainty cognition of the third kind provides is
thus a clear improvement over that granted by reason alone, which only
licenses the deduction of adequate ideas about how bodies would be if they
were formally real.
Is he thereby proceeding “to the adequate cognition of the [NS: formal]
essence of things” (E2p40s2)? “The essence of things” has often been
20 Cf. TIE 34. 21 See Garrett “Spinoza’s Theory,” p. 105. 22 See Akkerman, Studies.
23 The description of scientia intuitiva in E5p25d does not include “formal essences.” However, its
demonstration relies on propositions that do have to do with essences (E1p25 by way of E5p24).
24 Human beings can consider substance only under two attributes. If scientia intuitiva is the highest
sort of human cognition, then it makes sense for Spinoza to say “certain,” or “some” attributes
(quorundam attributorum) rather than just “attributes.”
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interpreted as the essence of each thing that is suﬃcient to individuate it from
all other things.25 Again, if one thinks of reason as capturing only what
is common to things, then scientia intuitiva could be understood as an
immediate apprehension of how the innermost individuating essence of
each singular thing follows from the essence of an indivisible, inﬁnite
substance. Wilson reads Spinoza this way: “amazingly, the human mind is
able to achieve [a] God’s-eye understanding of the essences of singular
things, as they follow from the essence of God, thereby replicating the
insight into the divine creative power expressed in E1p16.”26
But the “essence of things” can be read in a second way, as the essence of
things (plural). The essence, or nature, of things is what things, qua things,
fundamentally are. Having an adequate idea of the formal essence of x means
having an adequate idea of what x fundamentally is that also represents x as
formally real. If reason is limited to representations of how things must be if
they are, then it makes sense for scientia intuitiva to supply knowledge that
those things are, and what, fundamentally, those things are – modes.27
On this view, scientia intuitiva does not require a cognizer to have an
adequate idea of nature that enables him to deduce exactly how nature is
modiﬁed in all its inﬁnite ways: all a cognizer needs is an adequate idea of
nature, considered under one of the attributes, as the one substance. So an
“adequate idea of the formal essence” of extension is just an adequate
idea of what extension fundamentally is: it’s one attribute of the one and
only necessarily existing substance. Because substance exists necessarily,
25 See Allison, Benedict de Spinoza; Curley, “Experience”; Soyarslan, “The Distinction”; and Wilson,
“Spinoza’s Theory.”
26 “Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge,” p. 113. See also Nadler’s “Baruch Spinoza” and Melamed’s
“Mapping the Labyrinth,” p. 112. In “Spinoza’s Theory,” Garrett agrees that scientia intuitiva is
an at-a-glance grasp of the causal structure of nature, but limits the scope of human scientia intuitiva
to avoid the implausible view that a human mind could achieve intuitive exhaustive causal knowl-
edge of particular things. On Garrett’s view, human minds can have scientia intuitiva of inﬁnite
modes: a ﬁnite mind can understand how God’s essence causes some particular inﬁnite mode (these
inﬁnite modes are, on Garrett’s interpretation, “formal essences.” Note that if formal essences are
inﬁnite modes, then it is, as Garrett points out, curious why Spinoza talks about the “formal
essences” of attributes.). I disagree with Garrett’s proposal that formal and actual essences are
diﬀerent kinds of essences (see Section III), and I do not think it makes sense to identify an inﬁnite
mode as the essence of a ﬁnite thing, but I agree with Garrett that scientia intuitiva is not super-
insight into all of nature. Nevertheless, I think the scientia intuitivaGarrett thinks humanminds can
have is mysterious. How do we see, in a glance, how certain inﬁnite modes follow from the essence of
God, an essence that is just eternal existence understood under either the attribute of thought or the
attribute of extension?
27 This gloss of the “essence of things” is consistent with the proposition that what is “common to all”
does not constitute the essence of any singular thing (E2p37). All things are fundamentally modes,
but if one wants to isolate a singular mode, one will have to cite distinguishing properties. On my
interpretation, human beings cannot come to have adequate ideas of the individuating essences of
singular things, even if they can have an adequate idea of the “essence of things” (as modes).
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understanding what substance fundamentally is is ipso facto to understand
it as formally real.
Rather than immediate insight into individuating essences, the entire
causal structure of nature, or how ﬁnite (or inﬁnite) modes can be deduced
from the essence of God, the intuition of scientia intuitiva is an immediate
apprehension of what things are: modes of the one and only substance
that can be considered under diﬀerent attributes, and not, for example,
Cartesian or Aristotelian substances. It also yields adequate ideas that
things are: if reason yields representations of how all bodies must be if
they are, then knowing that bodies are formally real allows a cognizer see
that reason’s representations are not just adequate, but also agree with
formally real ideata and are true (E1a6).
Scientia intuitiva thus looks like Cartesian scientia. For Descartes, once
we know the true metaphysical foundation of our being (the sustaining
activity of a necessarily existing, benevolent God who wouldn’t create
creatures incapable of having true ideas), we can be certain that the ideas
judged best by a phenomenal, internalist criterion (clarity and distinctness)
are also judged best by an externalist epistemic criterion (they are true of
an extra-mental reality).28 For Spinoza, once we know the metaphysical
foundation of all being (the one necessarily existing substance’s sustaining
activity of its modes), we can be certain that all of the ideas judged best by
an internalist criterion (adequacy, as “intrinsic denominations” excluding
“what is extrinsic, namely the agreement of an idea with its ideatum”
(E2d4)) are also judged best by an externalist epistemic criterion (adequate
ideas are true because they agree with formally real ideata (E1a6)).
How does this work? Consider a reasoning cognizer, trained in
Cartesianism, who sees that extension is common to “the part and the
whole” of any of his ideas of body. He sees that what is presupposed by
any representation of body is not an indeﬁnitely extensible, divisible-into-
parts, 3-D grid in which one can imagine bodies placed – such an imagi-
native representation itself presupposes a conception of inﬁnite, eternal,
unique, and indivisible extension.29 Furthermore, he sees that, like all
representations, this conception of extension has objective reality – in
28 On the basis of Euclidean common notions, an atheist geometer can “clearly know” (clare cognoscere)
that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Yet he cannot have certain and
unshakeable scientia because he has not yet “come to know the author of [his] being” (Principles I.13).
29 See E1p15s. This ur-conception of extension is an idea (because anything in the mind is an idea), but
it is diﬃcult to say more about what sort of representation it is (and it is a representation, as all ideas
are). It is clearly not an imagistic representation of some extended space as a unity, and it is not
a representation of imagined delimitations of that uniﬁed extended space. Perhaps this ur-
conception bears some resemblance to what Kant would call an a priori form of sensible intuition:
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this case, inﬁnite objective reality. He also sees that representations of
aﬀections of his body are ﬁnite, and asks where this representation of
inﬁnity comes from. He runs a Third Meditation causal argument for
the existence of God and concludes that God, who has an inﬁnite amount
of formal reality, must be the cause of this representation of extension.
Having seen that God is prior to and the cause of what is ﬁnite or
indeﬁnite, he asks what this causal priority is like. He has been taught that
God is a transcendent sustaining cause of creation. However, he’s now
bothered by a mystery: how does esse get transmitted from a transcendent
God to a ﬁnite creature?
Setting aside questions of origin and adequacy for now, suppose our
cognizer has the following idea in a ﬂash: the fundamental metaphysics is
this: there is just one necessarily existing substance and its modes, and the very
same substance can be considered under diﬀerent attributes. There is no
mysterious transmission of esse from a transcendent God to a ﬁnite crea-
ture. There is causal and ontological priority of the inﬁnite because God is
the one substance; everything else is a mode that must be immanently
caused by and conceived through God. Furthermore, extension and
thought are not attributes of distinct substances; the one substance and
its modes can be considered under diﬀerent attributes.
He sees that his idea of inﬁnite extension just is the idea of God, the one
and only necessarily existing substance, considered under the attribute of
extension. Since extension necessarily has formal reality, his representa-
tions of extension’s necessary features agree with how formally real exten-
sion is structured.30 His adequate ideas of “what is equally in the part and
whole” of extension are true representations of the formally real inﬁnite
modes of the one substance, considered under the attribute of extension. He
now has adequate ideas of the “formal essence” of the structural features of
extension: he has adequate representations of what those features funda-
mentally are that also represents them as formally real.
If having the right metaphysics lets him see inﬁnite extension as necessa-
rily formally real, it also enables him to regard inﬁnite thought as necessarily
formally real substance, and he sees that extension and thought are one and
the same formally real substance considered under diﬀerent attributes.
He sees that one and the same mode can be considered under the attribute
it is this ur-conception that enables us to perceive and cognize extension in the ﬁrst place, but this
ur-conception is not itself a representation of an extended ﬁeld or ﬁgure.
30 Spinoza is conﬁdent that when a reasoning cognizer discerns necessary features of represented
bodies, he is accessing how bodies must be if they are formally real. Post-Kantian sensibilities might
push us to resist this move.
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of thought (as an idea or mind) and under the attribute of extension
(as body).31 It’s axiomatic that he thinks (E2a2), and before his monist
insight, he could form an idea of his own thinking. But now he knows that
his mind has formal reality in virtue of being a mode, a mode that is one
and the same mode as his body. He now has adequate ideas of the “formal
essence” of his body and mind: he has adequate ideas of what his body and
mind fundamentally are (the same mode considered under diﬀerent attri-
butes) that also represent his body and mind as formally real.
This is a powerful insight. Recall that all of the representational content
of ideas of reason can be traced to the mind’s consideration of the
agreements, diﬀerences, and oppositions of representations of the body’s
aﬀections. Reason’s universals represent necessary transitions between
representations, so from an adequate representation of an aﬀection of his
body, our reasoning cognizer could infer how an external body would have
to be in order to cause that aﬀection. But now he can see that adequate
representations of how his body must be, adequate higher-order represen-
tations based on representations of his body, and any representations
necessarily implicated by adequate representations of his body (including
implicated representations of bodies distinct from his own) are true.
Given his monist intuition, it’s not just that he can be certain about
what he is thinking when he is thinking it; he can also be certain that there
are bodies (and minds) besides his own, that his clear and distinct repre-
sentations of how bodies and minds must be are veridical, and that his clear
and distinct representations of the necessary relations between bodies and
minds (universals of reason) are truth-preserving. He can thus form an
idea – an adequate idea, because it can be explained wholly by other ideas
he has – that all of his clear and distinct ideas are true.32
V. Truth and Certainty
On my interpretation, only cognition of the third kind allows one to
see from the ﬁrst-person point of view that all of one’s adequate
31 I follow Della Rocca’s interpretation that the “one and the same” language indicates numerical
identity. See Representation, pp. 118–171. For criticisms of Della Rocca’s view, see C. Marshall,
“The Mind and the Body,” and Silverman, “The Union.”
32 E2p47s states that from an adequate idea of God’s essence and existence, “a great many things” can
be deduced, thus forming the third kind of cognition. Interpreters have read this as many
individuating essences can be deduced from the essence of God, but what such deductions look
like is left unspeciﬁed. On my account, it is clear what these deductions look like: they are just the
deductions one can perform using universals of reason. Once one has the intuition of monism, the
results of those deductions are known to be true of extra-mental formal reality.
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representations agree with anything formally real. However, Spinoza has
been interpreted as obviating the need for such validation. According to
the usual story, reason and scientia intuitiva do not diﬀer in their level of
certainty: both yield adequate ideas and all adequate ideas are necessarily
true (E2p34, E2p41). Furthermore, whoever cognizes a thing truly must
have an adequate idea of his own cognition, so must be certain (E2p43d).
Since certainty attends both reason and scientia intuitiva, it seems reason
and scientia intuitiva cannot be distinguished in the way I’ve proposed.
Notice, however, that E2p41 and E2p43 rely on E2p34, and E2p34’s
demonstration only works on the assumptions: (1) that an adequate idea in
the humanmind is part of the inﬁnite intellect of God; and (2) that all ideas
in God’s mind agree with their ideata and are true (E2p7c). If my inter-
pretation of reason is correct, then reason is neutral with regard to the
foundational metaphysics: it seems Spinoza can allow one to have adequate
ideas of properties of things even if one hasn’t settled whether those things
are Cartesian created substances or Spinozian modes. In the next section,
I’ll discuss how reason’s adequate ideas can yield adequate ideas of founda-
tional metaphysics, but for now, I just want to emphasize that a cognizer
can reason without presupposing the monist framework.33
We can take two perspectives on reason’s adequate ideas. The ﬁrst
perspective is that of the metaphysician who has accepted monism and
is thinking about the reasoning cognizer: the metaphysician will see that
the reasoning cognizer’s adequate ideas of reason are necessarily true.
The second perspective is that of the reasoner who hasn’t yet read the
Ethics: such a cognizer might see his own ideas as adequate, but lack the
resources to see that all of them, including adequate ideas representing
necessary features of bodies, must be true.
Yet consider E2p42. There, Spinoza says that reason and scientia intui-
tiva help the cognizer distinguish the true from the false. Here the cogni-
zer’s ﬁrst-person perspective is made explicit, and it is explicit that
a reasoner can have ideas both of the true and of the false.
I do not think E2p42 forces us to say that the reasoner and the cognizer
with scientia intuitiva do not diﬀer with respect to certainty and truth,
however. While a reasoner can have true ideas, and know he has true ideas,
his epistemic situation is still not optimal.
33 I argue for this elsewhere, but my interpretation of 1a4 (“cognition of an eﬀect depends on and
involves cognition of its cause”) does not require that any cognition of an eﬀect depends on and
involves every one of its causes. A cognizer can cognize an eﬀect without cognizing its immanent,
sustaining cause (i.e., substance); this is why a reasoner can have cognitions about transitive causes
without presupposing monism.
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A reasoner can know that some of his clear and distinct representations
agree with ideata. A reasoner can discern whether a representation, R, of
another one of his ideas, i, agrees with i.34 Furthermore, we can see how
truth and adequacy coincide for a reasoning cognizer: to see that he has an
adequate idea, a reasoner needs to see that a higher-order representation of
an idea agrees with a lower-order idea.
If certainty is a matter of having adequate ideas of one’s cognition,
a reasoner can be certain about which adequate ideas he has.35 Because he
can be certain of adequate ideas of properties, common notions, and
universals, he can also be certain of the adequate ideas that follow from
other adequate ideas. Reason’s certainty is discursive, conditional certainty:
given certain adequate ideas, other adequate ideas must follow.
The certainty reason confers is certainty about causae secundum ﬁeri, or
productive eﬃcient causes.36 That is, reason yields adequate representa-
tions of the ways bodies and ideas must be and interact.37 A reasoner can
come to have ever more detailed ideas about the productive causes of
things, the necessary ways in which things in nature come to be.
Yet regardless of how many details he discovers, there is another cause
for a cognizer to know about: the causa secundum esse. Cognition of the
third kind pertains to this sort of cause: God sustains the very being of
things by being the substance in which all things inhere.38 Knowing how
the being of things is sustained by God (i.e., by being modes of the one
necessarily existing substance) enables a cognizer to know that the conclu-
sions he draws as a reasoner are not just coherently ordered constructs of
34 Truth will be its own standard. If a reasoner needed to measure truth by another standard besides his
recognition that a representation of one idea agrees with another one of his ideas, an inﬁnite regress
would result. See E2p43s.
35 One might worry that one could have inadequate representations that masquerade as genuinely
adequate representations. I think Spinoza is conﬁdent that one cannot be mistaken about which of
one’s ideas are adequate: only clear and distinct ideas are adequate, and clarity and distinctness are
phenomenologically manifest.
36 Reasoning about abstracta like triangles involves cognition of necessary features of extension and
necessary rules concerning the transformation and construction of triangles. This is manipulation of
representational contents, and can be understood as cognition of causae secundum ﬁeri within the
attribute of thought.
37 Elsewhere Spinoza says that the essence of things is to be found in the “series of ﬁxed and eternal
things . . . and the laws inscribed in these things as in their true codes, according to which all singular
things come to be [ﬁeri] and are ordered” (TIE 100–101, my emphasis). As I understand it, reason is
cognition of these laws; if Spinoza still thinks of essences in the Ethics as he did in the TIE, then
cognition of the second kind is cognition of essences – just not cognition of individuating essences.
38 Lloyd (Part of Nature) and Garrett (“Spinoza’s Theory”) think that scientia intuitiva is the only
cognition that secures why and how knowledge; reason only gets you knowledge that. However,
I think both reason and scientia intuitiva yield why and how knowledge: it’s just that they provide
diﬀerent sorts of such knowledge, each corresponding to a diﬀerent sort of eﬃcient causation.
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the human mind, but agree with a formally real, extra-mental reality.39
With scientia intuitiva, adequacy and truth coincide, but here there is
agreement of ideas with formally real extension, rather than (as was the
case with reason) agreement of ideas with other ideas (some perhaps about
extension).40
VI. The Importance of Intuitive Cognition
In Section IV, I explained that on my view, the starting idea for cognition
of the third kind, an “adequate idea of the formal essence of certain
attributes of God,” is an adequate idea of what certain attributes, extension
or thought, fundamentally are: attributes of the one and only necessarily
existing (and so necessarily formally real) substance, in which all things
inhere as modes. From this adequate idea, other adequate ideas follow
(E2p40) – adequate ideas of the formal reality of things, as well as an
adequate idea with the content all adequate, i.e., clear and distinct, repre-
sentations agree with formal reality and are true.
But what ensures that this starting idea is adequate? Spinoza emphasizes
that each and every human mind has an adequate cognition of God’s
eternal and inﬁnite essence (E2p47). Human minds represent bodies as
formally real (or actual), but “equally in the part and the whole” of each of
these representations is the representation of extension as an attribute of
the one necessarily existing substance. In principle at least, everyone can
“deduce from this cognition a great many things . . . and so can form that
third kind of cognition” (E2p47s).
Yet one can have an idea, and that idea could be obscured by other,
perhaps inadequate ideas. One could mistake another, perhaps inadequate,
idea for the requisite idea of God. If a cognizer hopes to have scientia
intuitiva, it’s imperative that he understand that, though he might have
thought of God as anthropomorphic or transcendent, in fact God must be
39 Onmy view, how many things a cognizer can know by the third kind of cognition depends on how
many common notions, adequate ideas of the properties of things, and universals he has. Reason
determines how ﬁne-grained our cognitions can be. I therefore disagree with Soyarslan’s view that
scientia intuitiva somehow reaches a “level of particularity” that reason does not enable us to reach.
40 Another diﬀerence between reason and scientia intuitiva concerns how a cognizer recognizes
agreement of ideas and ideata. A reasoning cognizer considers the higher-order and lower-order
ideas at once, and understands their agreements, diﬀerences, and oppositions (cf. E2p29s).
However, a cognizer cannot apprehend a formally real body directly to compare it to the repre-
sentation of that body: that would involve a mode of extension (the formally real body) causing
a mode of thought (the idea of how that formally real body and the representation of that body
agree), and that cannot happen (E2p6). So recognition of the agreement of idea and ideatum
involved in cognition of the third kind must be indirect.
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the one and only necessarily existing substance that can be considered
under diﬀerent attributes.
All of us have at our disposal the materials for thinking of God in the
correct monist way, but thinking of God this way is diﬃcult and not
assured. Here is how reading the Ethics can help: if a cognizer can “follow
the force of the demonstrations” of the ﬁrst part of the Ethics, he will arrive
at the right idea of God, and will recognize that that idea of God, as
substance, was in fact presupposed in any of his ideas of bodies, which he
now recognizes as modes.41
But following along, even if it culminates in the correct, adequate,
demonstratively certain representation of God, is still just cognition of
the second kind. Furthermore, if cognition of the second kind is only
cognition of representations that may or may not agree with formal reality,
then one could complain that the demonstrations of the Ethics do not
establish that God, the one and only necessarily existing substance, really
does have extra-mental formal reality. Isn’t it the case that all that’s been
established is that from certain common notions (adequate representations
of representations of aﬀections of the body), another adequate representa-
tion – a representation of God – can be formed?
This is a version of the Cartesian Circle: one can establish the veracity of
all adequate ideas (including ideas about extension) only if one knows both
whatGod is (substance) and thatGod is (has formal reality), yet one cannot
really establish thatGod is unless one already assumes what one is trying to
prove.
In his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Spinoza discusses the objection
that Descartes’s reasoning involves circularity. For Spinoza, Descartes
erred in deriving the existence of God from uncertain premises, and not
taking the existence of God to be known per se. Spinoza thinks that
circularity can be avoided if the existence of God is known immediately,
without reasoning from premises.42
Worries about whether God is a deceiver are absent from the Ethics: God
just isn’t a God that could be deceiving or undeceiving. On my view, what
has not dropped out is the concern that in order to avoid circularity,
41 In Section II, I suggested that the common notions of reason might be very general: the mind can
discern that for any representation whatsoever, it will be the case that what is represented is “either in
itself or in another” (E1a1), that what is represented did not come from nothing (because nothing can
come from nothing), that what is represented cannot at the same time both be and not be, or logical
rules of inference. I think we can add to this list E1a2, E1a3, E1a4, and the whole list of axioms and
deﬁnitions that ﬁgure in Spinoza’s demonstration of his substance monism in Part I of the Ethics.
42 See Bolton’s “Spinoza on Cartesian Doubt” for discussion of Spinoza’s response to the Cartesian
Circle. Bolton does not attempt to explain how Spinoza secures certainty, however.
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apprehension of God’s necessary existence must be immediate and not the
result of any discursive procedure. That is, it needs to be intuitive.
Whether cognition can be intuitive – and temporally immediate –
depends on what sort of cause is cognized. E1a4 states that cognition of
an eﬀect depends on and involves cognition of its cause. One thing I take
this axiom to mean is that things (modes) can be cognized either as eﬀects
of transitive, productive causes or as eﬀects of the immanent, sustaining
cause (God qua substance).43 When one cognizes a thing as the eﬀect of
a transitive, productive cause, one must cognize it in relation to a separate
cause.44 In contrast, when one cognizes a thing as an eﬀect of substance as
an immanent, sustaining cause, one must not cognize the eﬀect as caused
by a separate entity: to do so would be to misunderstand the nature of
the substance–mode relation.45 When a thing is cognized as the eﬀect of
a sustaining cause, there just isn’t room for any discursive steps. In uno
intuitu, one sees that the mode has its existence in virtue of inhering in the
one necessarily existing substance; one cannot insert any doubt, or see
much of a causal or conceptual structure to this thought. It is as indubitable
and immediate as one’s recognition of the ratio 1 has to 2.46
A mind’s representation of God as substance can be cognized by reason
as the necessary eﬀect of transitive causes: that is, the conclusion necessi-
tated by the demonstrations of the arguments of the Ethics (as the ideas
involved in those demonstrations cause the concluding idea). But a mind
can also cognize any thing as the eﬀect of the one substance’s activity as the
immanent causa secundum esse.47 A mind immediately sees that the thing
has its being as a mode inhering in the one and only substance.
So a representation of God as Spinozistic substance can be a demon-
stratively certain conclusion of a chain of deductions, but this only
establishes that from some adequate representations of necessary features
43 I discuss this elsewhere.
44 A separate cause could be another entity or a distinct state of the thing at a previous time (trans-
temporal identity would be secured by the preservation of the ratio of motion and rest. See E2p12.).
I discuss how a distinct state of a thing at a previous time can be considered a transitive cause in other
work.
45 Cf. E1p28s2.
46 E2p40s2. “Given the numbers 1, 2, and 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is
6 – and we see this much more clearly because we infer the fourth number from the ratio which, in
one glance (uno intuitu videmus), we see the ﬁrst number to have to the second.” What is seen
intuitively is the ratio the ﬁrst number has to the second; it is not (as is usually supposed), the
inference. I think the example is supposed to illustrate: (1) the immediacy and lack of inferential
structure in an intuition; (2) that what one can infer on the basis of that intuition is especially
certain, and that as a consequence; (3) the intuition enhances what one can do with reasoning.
47 Scientia intuitiva crucially involves the idea of God as a cause (see E5p32). What deserves more
discussion is Spinoza’s claim that the mind is the formal cause of the third kind of cognition (E5p31).
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of bodies and ideas, an adequate representation of God can be formed.
The way out of the circle is scientia intuitiva, which is an immediate
cognition of God that can be certain in the way reason cannot be.
The Ethics can help a reader reach the right representation of God, and so
can do some of the work in preparing him to have the requisite intuition.
However, simply reading the Ethics does not guarantee scientia intuitiva: it is
one thing to have the cognition that given some axioms, deﬁnitions, and
demonstrations, things must be modes caused by and inhering in the one
substance. It is an entirely diﬀerent thing to immediately cognize those
things as modes caused by and inhering in the one substance.
The latter sort of cognition will aﬀect the mind much more.48However,
its power does not simply consist in its giving the non-circular epistemic
assurance that all of one’s adequate ideas are true: I think it’s crucial that
scientia intuitiva results in God, self, and world being presented in
a diﬀerent way.
Reason’s monist-metaphysical representations of God, self, and the
world seem liable to evaporate once one stops attending to the demonstra-
tions and is merry with one’s friends, as Hume might put it. More needs to
be said, but I think scientia intuitiva is supposed to minimize the distance
between a cognizer’s everyday experience of the world and a more theore-
tical frame of mind. Once one has scientia intuitiva, the usual misguided
ways of thinking about everything just cannot be entertained, even once
one leaves the study and goes out into the world: the world is not such that
it could have been otherwise; God didn’t make the world because he
judged it to be good; human beings cannot extricate themselves from the
causal nexus of the natural world. Consequently, one’s attention and
energy will be directed elsewhere, and one will, if Spinoza is right, be
better able to control one’s aﬀects and enjoy the peace of mind that attends
a proper understanding of the world and one’s place in it.
One upshot of my interpretation is that scientia intuitiva and its
attendant beatitude are more achievable for ﬁnite minds than is some-
times supposed: it doesn’t require veridical apprehension of the inﬁnitely
complex causal structure of nature49 or temporally immediate insight
into how some inﬁnite or ﬁnite mode is deduced from God’s essence.50
If one knows that all there can be is the one substance and its modes, then
48 Cf. E5p36s. 49 See especially Wilson, “Spinoza’s Theory.”
50 See D. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Theory,” and Nadler “Spinoza’s Ethics” and “Baruch Spinoza.” I’d like
to thank Colin Chamberlain, Michael Della Rocca, Dan Garber, Don Garrett, Colin Garretson,
Karolina Hübner, Raﬃ Krut-Landau, Yitzhak Melamed, Ohad Nachtomy, Alan Nelson, Sydney
Penner, Alison Peterman, Ursula Renz, Eric Schliesser, Tad Schmaltz, Daniel Schneider, and Ericka
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one can know that whatever adequate ideas one has come to have through
reasoning are true. Importantly, one may always be able to add to one’s
stock of adequate ideas through reasoning, but such incomplete causal
knowledge doesn’t preclude scientia intuitiva. This should be welcome
news to those who think Spinoza wrote the Ethics to help ﬁnite, all too
ﬁnite human beings live well.
Tucker for helpful conversation and/or comments. I also got very helpful feedback from audiences
at the University of Pittsburgh, NYU, Ghent, the South Central Seminar in Early Modern
Philosophy, and the 2015 NEH summer seminar in Boulder. Space limitations kept me from
developing this reading to my satisfaction, but I hope to say more (especially about cognition of
the second kind and the acquisition of adequate ideas) in future work.
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